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Ackerman’s Revolutionary constitutions supports the study of 
comparative constitutional law by providing a typology of constitution-
making processes and their effects over time. This typology is based on an 
analysis of the historical and political processes leading to the making of a 
constitution. Ackerman acknowledges the cosmopolitan dimensions in 
which the constitution making process always takes place. Nonetheless, his 
analysis rejects the possibility of a single blue print for constitutional 
projects. His vision of constitutional processes is therefore anchored to the 
idea of “rooted cosmopolitanism”, in which jurists and judges ultimately 
have a major role to play in the long run towards the stabilisation of a 
constitutional experience over time once the founding moment is passed 
and the constitution is not just imagined but must be lived. 
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1. Varieties of comparative constitutional law 
Constitutionalism has swept the world, and constitutional law 
has become a major source of legal change all around the globe. 
Massive research efforts in the field show that comparative 
constitutional law is living its golden age. In recent decades, this 
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subject enjoys a new, much more exciting intellectual life, enriched by 
controversy and dissent.  
Bruce Ackerman’s Revolutionary Constitutions, the first volume 
of a set of three, is a major contribution to the further development of 
the field. The work is inspired by the ambition of putting: “…the 
bewildering complexity of global [constitutional] experience into a 
compelling comparative framework.”1. 
As a result of the above mentioned change of pace, there are 
now available large scale quantitative studies mapping the various 
features of constitutions of the countries around the world2. These 
studies help to detect a whole range of global and regional trends. 
They help to clarify, for example, how frequent the incorporation of 
certain rights – such as the right to health - is in the constitutions of 
the various countries3. They document, for instance, the spreading of 
constitutional clauses in the Arab world that affirm Islamic law as 
supreme, or provide that laws repugnant to Islam will be void4. On 
the other hand, by now several studies show how judicial decisions 
by supreme courts or constitutional courts handle comparative 
materials on questions that have already been the object of judicial 
deliberations elsewhere5. Recently, the Italian Constitutional Court 
                                                   
1 B. Ackerman, Revolutionary Constitutions: Charismatic Leadership and the Rule of Law 
1, (2019). 
2 The best example of this kind is the Comparative Constitutions Project, directed 
by Zachary Elkins (University of Texas, Department of Government), Tom 
Ginsburg (University of Chicago, Law School), and James Melton, which produces 
comprehensive data about the world’s constitutions that can be consulted at: 
<https://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/>. 
3 Cp. H. Matsuura, ‘The Effect of a Constitutional Right to Health on Population Health 
in 157 Countries, 1970–2007: The Role of Democratic Governance’, PGDA Working 
Paper no. 106, Harvard University (2013). 
4 D.I. Ahmed, T. Ginsburg, ‘Constitutional Islamization and Human Rights: The 
Surprising Origin and Spread of Islamic Supremacy in Constitutions’ 54 Va. J. Int'l L. 
615, (2013). 
5 See., eg., G. Halmai, ‘The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation’, in: M. 
Rosenfeld, A. Sajó, (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (2012) 
1328; M. Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts (2013); T. Groppi, 
M.C. Ponthoreau, The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges (2013); E. 
Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Changing Practices of Western Highest Courts (2013); R. Hirschl, Comparative Matters: 
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ruled on the unconstitutionality of a criminal law provision that 
punishes assistance to suicide provided to patients that are in certain 
serious, irreversible conditions, and who are still able to exercise 
autonomy6. In an interim decision on the issue, released in 20187, the 
Italian Constitutional Court cited the UK Supreme Court decision in 
R (Nicklinson) v. Ministry of Justice8, and the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Carter v. Canada9, to come to the conclusion that it was necessary to 
suspend the proceedings pending before it to order to give 
Parliament the opportunity to legislate on the issue. Parliament did 
nothing, and the Court thus handed down its decision. nonetheless, 
the unusual move of suspending the deliberation of the case for a 
year was surely fortified by the knowledge of foreign precedents, 
which the Court duly cited. Legislatures, too, often have the 
opportunity to consider how foreign parliaments have catered for 
emerging societal problems under their respective constitutions. The 
familiar examples of constitutional debates in which elements 
deriving from different constitutional experiences become part of the 
local constitutional conversation are by now too many to be 
examined in detail here10. All in all, they are perhaps the most 
apparent symptoms of a cosmopolitan outlook on what constitutional 
law is, or can be, in this epoch11. Whether the spread of this tendency 
should be considered an unmitigated good or not can be seriously 
debated. It is well known that the US Supreme Court has taken part 
                                                                                                                                  
The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law (2014), M. Andenas, D. Fairgrieve 
(eds) Courts and Comparative Law (2015). 
6 Corte Costituzionale, Judgment n. 242/2019, available at 
<https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgment
s/Sentenza_n_242_del_2019_Modugno_en.pdf> (last consulted on 20 January 
2020). 
7 Corte Costituzionale, Ordinance n. 207/2018, available at: 
<http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/2018/0207o-18.html> (last consulted on 27 
September 2019). 
8 [2014] UKSC 38. 
9 (2015) CSC 5. 
10 They are documented in leading textbooks: N. Dorsen, M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó, S. 
Baer, S. Mancini, Comparative constitutionalism: cases and materials (2016); V. C. 
Jackson, M. Tushnet, Comparative constitutional law (2014). 
11 Human rights law is as well experiencing the same tendency, and in turn 
provides intellectual ammunitions in favour of such cosmopolitan approach: see, 
e.g., S. Fredman, Comparative Human Rights Law (2018). 
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in this debate in recent decades. I will not consider the matter further, 
but he staunch defence of American exceptionalism in the field of 
constitutional law has pushed some Justices to flatly reject the idea of 
consulting foreign laws while deciding constitutional issues. Other 
members of the Court hold instead that this attitude simply deprives 
the Court of the possibility of gaining insights and perspective from 




2. Rooted cosmopolitanism 
In any case, even the most ardent believer in the utility of an 
open minded approach to the study of foreign constitutional 
experience for the purpose of drawing some lessons from it would 
recognise there are limits to a cosmopolitan approach to 
constitutionalism. 
Each constitutional experience has certain peculiar, local traits, 
which defy easy conclusions about the transferability of 
constitutional norms. Even when the constitutional document of a 
country was drafted by taking as a template, or as a source of 
inspiration, a prior constitutional text, the constitution as the law of a 
country is unique, in a sense: it is out on its own, and will have its 
own fate12. In making this assessment I am not necessarily referring 
to the text of the constitution itself. I am rather thinking of the 
particular constitutional experience that is symbolized by a certain 
constitutional text. 
Many constitutions have origins that unveil the influence of a 
whole range of foreign ideas and precedents. But over time, even 
these components will be inscribed in the concrete political, 
institutional, and social life of a particular polity. The idea of a living 
constitution, among others, reflects this dynamic. Aristotle’s famous 
remark that “there are constitutions which according to law incline 
towards democracy, but by reason of their customs and training 
                                                   
12 The notion of ‘constitutional identity’ which in this book is used with great 
moderation, is sometimes used to turn this rather obvious remark into a platform 
for a variety of claims, including nationalist claims. 
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operate more like oligarchies”13 shows how old this idea is: it is 
surely not some newfangled rhetorical device to justify, e.g. unbound 
judicial law making. To put it simply, the text of the constitutional 
document does not tell the full story of a constitution. Therefore the 
constitution is “best understood” not as a document, but “as a 
historically rooted tradition of theory and practice” according to the 
diagnosis that Bruce Ackerman formulated some years ago14. 
Interestingly, this is also the language spoken by the Treaty of 
the European Union and by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
These fundamental texts consider the constitutional traditions 
common to the Members States as general principles of EU law in the 
field of fundamental rights. Beyond the values and the norms 
proclaimed in the Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
the glue to cement the EU’s approach to fundamental rights is not 
what national constitutional documents recite, but what the shared 
constitutional traditions of the Member States stand for. 
Within this framework, once what is peculiar and original to 
each constitutional experience is seriously considered, how is it 
possible to draw more meaningful constitutional comparisons? 
This is precisely the question at the centre of Ackerman’s book, 
and of the two volumes that should complete the intellectual project 
outlined in this publication. This question becomes more urgent than 
ever when the custodians of the constitution have a keen sense of the 
originality of their particular constitutional experience grounded in 
the constitutional document. Once more there are classical precedents 
for this way of thinking. Pericles’ funeral oration for the war dead 
over two thousand years ago is famous for this pronouncement:  
“We have a form of government which does not emulate the 
practice of our neighbours: we are more an example to others 
than an imitation of them.”15. 
                                                   
13 Aristotle, Politics IV, 1292b17-20, tr. by T.A. Sinclair, revised and re-presented by 
T.J. Saunders (1992), 253. 
14 See B. Ackerman, We The People: Foundations (1991), 22. 
15 Pericles’ funeral oration in Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, (M. Hammond 
trans. 2009), 2.37, 91. 
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This eloquent sentence captures well sentiments and 
arguments that return over and over in history. Indeed, insisting on 
the originality and exceptionality of the US constitutional experience, 
is just one way to come to the conclusion that each constitution is 
ultimately rooted in its own environment, in the moral, ethical, and 
political life of a particular society, and that this is by itself a 
formidable obstacle to meaningful constitutional transfers. Rousseau 
and Hegel, among other classical thinkers, shared this conclusion16. 
Pondering on the Polish constitution, Rousseau wrote:  
 
 “Unless one knows the nation for which one is working 
thoroughly, one's labor on its behalf, regardless of how 
excellent it may be in itself, will invariably fall short in 
application, and even more so in the case of an already fully 
instituted nation, whose tastes, morals, prejudices and vices 
are too deeply rooted to be easily stifled by new seeds.”17 
 
These words come after a draft constitution for Corsica, 
written by Rousseau at the demand of Matteo Buttafuoco and 
Pasquale Paoli, when the island had just established its independence 
as a republic by rebelling against Genoa.  
Bruce Ackerman’s Revolutionary constitutions sets out to answer 
the question about how to proceed on this uncertain terrain. In 
developing his approach, Ackerman does not intend to reject 
cosmopolitanism, but rather to recalibrate it, by working to eschew its 
traps and pitfalls, through the possibility of producing deeper 
comparisons. In doing so, Ackerman charts a new territory for 
comparative constitutional law. 
Here I will not focus on the reconstruction of each 
constitutional experience covered by the author in the chapters or 
parts of the book to assess their accuracy, although the dazzling 
coverage of nine constitutional experiences (Burma/Myanmar, 
                                                   
16 Cp. D. T. Butler Ritchie, ‘Organic Constitutionalism: Rousseau, Hegel and the 
Constitution of Society’ 6 J L Soc'y 36, (2005). 
17 J.-J. Rousseau, ‘Consideration on the Government of Poland and its projected 
reformation’, in Rousseau: The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings 
(2nd, ed. trans. V. Gourevitch, 2018),  181 ff. 
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France, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, South Africa, and the United States) is 
by itself an extraordinary achievement. Nor do I intend to examine 
the fitting of such constitutional experiences into the structure that 
provides the basic architecture of the book. Some of the recently 
published contributions that discuss the book have questioned 
Ackerman’s work on one or other of these points with respect to 
India18, Italy19, and Poland20. I am not surprised that some critical 
reservations have been made in this respect. Any intellectual 
enterprise as vast and ambitious as the one that informs this book 
(and the two following volumes that should complete Ackerman’s 
coverage of the subject) is bound to take some risks, and to generate 
some controversy. Two centuries after its publication, Montesquieu’s 
Spirit of the laws is still the target of critical observations that highlight 
some errors committed by the author of that immense work21. It 
would be surprising if a book and a project with a scope and 
ambition on the same scale as that first monumental comparative 
treatise did not present some shortcomings. Considering the risk of 
some inaccuracies, Ackerman could well have adorned his book with 
the same quotation put by O.W. Holmes Jr in the last line of the 
preface to The Common Law to anticipate some of his critics: “Nous 
faisons une théorie et non un spicilège.”.  
Revolutionary constitutions is indeed, first of all, laying out a 
theory to provide fruitful and deeper constitutional comparisons at 
the world level. This theory is encapsulated in the expression rooted 
cosmopolitanism, an apparent oxymoron, first introduced in the last 
chapter of the book, dedicated to the US constitutional experience. 
Despite this late appearance in the book, rooted cosmopolitanism is a 
notion that pervades the entire book, and animates the intellectual 
                                                   
18 A. K. Thiruvengadam, Evaluating Bruce Ackerman’s “Pathways to Constitutionalism” 
and India as an exemplar of “revolutionary constitutionalism on a human scale”, 17 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 682, (2019). 
19 D. Tega, The Constitution of the Italian Republic: Not revolution, but principled 
liberation, 17 International Journal of Constitutional Law 690, (2019). 
20 T. T. Koncewicz, Understanding Polish pacted (r)evolution(s) of 1989 and the politics of 
resentment of 2015–2018 and beyond, 17 International Journal of Constitutional Law 
695, (2017). 
21 L. Claus, ‘Montesquieu’s mistakes and the true meaning of separation’ , 25 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 419, (2015). 
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project behind it. In advancing it, Ackerman makes a first important 
point. To put it as an anthropologist famously put it: law, like 
gardening, sailing, or politics: ‘works by the light of the local 
knowledge’22, and yet, the local dimensions of the constitution are 
still inscribed into the broader cosmopolitan dimension, that sets the 
discursive framework of the constitutional conversations occurring 
over time in each country. So, for example, history shows how the 
constitutions of Poland and Iran are both indebted to the constitution 
of the fifth French republic, with fateful consequences for both 
countries. 
This approach allows Ackerman to more generally reject the 
idea that there can be a single model of constitutionalism23. The 
circumstance that the same verbal formulas occur over and over in 
constitutional documents spread across the world should not lead to 
the easy conclusion that they express identical concepts and the same 
constitutional commitments. Actually, these formulas are often 
written in disparate languages, a point that should by itself suggest 
caution in reaching this conclusion. Therefore the repetition in a 
constitutional text of verbiage coined elsewhere should never be 
taken at face value:  
 
“….the same formula can take on very different meanings in 
radically different cultures. To take one example the principle 
of “human dignity” is used in very different ways within the 
revolutionary culture of Israel, the antirevolutionary culture of 
Germany, and the Anglo-establishmentarian culture of 
Canada.”24 
 
This vital remark warns that the large scale collection of 
constitutional texts and provisions can tell us which written formulas 
have fortune in the process of constitutional law making, and little 
more. The power of the form is not to be underrate, of course. But to 
learn more about constitutions and constitutional dynamics, we have 
                                                   
22 C. Geertz, ‘Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective’ in Id., Local 
Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (1983), 167. 
23 In a critical vein on this issue see: G. Frankenberg (ed.), Order from Transfer: 
Comparative Constitutional Design and Legal Culture (2013). 
24 Ackerman, Revolutionary Constitutions, cit. at 1, 362.  
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to look elsewhere, as Revolutionary constitutions does. Therefore, 
Ackerman’s approach resonates with other remarks and observations 
that discuss the limits of unbridled cosmopolitanism, while admitting 
that comparative law has a role to play in the interpretation of the 
law. This approach resonates with the analysis of the use of 
comparative law by the European Court of Justice advanced by Judge 
Siniša Rodin25. For Rodin the ontology of each constitutional 
experience is decisive in establishing how the comparative study of 
foreign material comes into play in the process of constitutional 
adjudication. 
Ackerman holds that some constitutional experiences should 
therefore be more carefully considered by Americans when 
considering foreign constitutional ideas or solutions. In historical and 
political terms the more relevance experiences are those embodying 
the same constitutional law-making process that the American 
revolution first experimented. Ackerman does not at all rule out the 
possibility of reaching beyond the divide that separates constitutions 
of one kind from constitutions of a different kind in his typology. 
Nonetheless, such separation should be seriously taken into account, 
rather than blissfully ignored, when looking for helpful comparisons.  
In looking beyond the texts of the constitutional documents, 
Ackerman draws upon law, politics, history, and sociology. This 
interdisciplinary approach leads Ackerman to build a typology of 
constitutional experiences that is the cornerstone of his comparative 
approach.  
The first constitutional ideal type is provided by the case in 
which “revolutionary-outsiders manage to oust establishment-
insiders from political authority”. The countries examined in this 
volume all fall under this category. Ackerman’s other two categories, 
as outlined in the introductory chapter of the book, are respectively 
the “establishment-constitutions” and the “elite construction 
constitutions”. In the establishment constitutions ”the political order 
is built by pragmatic insiders, not revolutionary outsiders”. This 
happens because establishment insiders manage to isolate the more 
radical outsiders and co-opt instead the more moderate among them 
                                                   
25 S. Rodin, ‘Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions’ 64 Am. J. Comp. L. 
815, (2016). 
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in the process of constitutional change. Great Britain, Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand all belong to this typology along with 
other countries in Scandinavia, Latin America and Asia. All these 
countries “…share a distrust for ringing revolutionary principles and 
emphasize the virtue of prudent adaptation.”26. Elite construction 
constitutions are represented by countries like Spain, Germany, 
Japan. The constitutions of these countries are the by-product of a 
dynamic in which the old system of government is collapsing, but the 
population is relatively passive. At this point: “…the power vacuum 
is occupied by previously excluded political and social elites, who 
serve as a principal force in the creation of a new constitutional 
order.”27. In this scenario, the crisis is so serious that the old elite can 
hope to retain some power only by making an elaborate compact 
with the outsiders, something that does not occur under 
establishment type constitutions. 
Revolutionary constitutions is therefore the first of three books 
by Ackerman that examine key constitutional experiences with the 
help of the interpretative keys offered by these models. 
This first volume sets out to explain how the constitutional 
path moves from revolutionary impulse, mass mobilisation, and the 
agency of charismatic figures to the constitutionalisation of charisma- 
to use the language of the author - as the ultimate result of a 
revolution on a human scale. History shows that, more often than 
not, this is an anticlimactic trajectory. Looking back to the 
achievement of independence by that part of the world that had 
endured colonialism, and successfully fought against it, Clifford 
Geertz shows what such trajectory implies:  
 
“It is not that nothing has happened, that a new era has not 
been entered. Rather, that era having been entered, it is 
necessary now to live in it rather than merely imagine it, and 
that is inevitably a deflating experience. 
The signs of this darkened mood are everywhere: in nostalgia 
for the emphatic personalities and well-made dramas of the 
revolutionary struggle; in disenchantment with party politics, 
                                                   
26 Ackerman, Revolutionary constitutions,  cit. at 1,  5. 
27 Ackerman, Revolutionary constitutions,  cit. at 1, 6. 
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parliamentarianism, bureaucracy, and the new class of 
soldiers…..”28 
 
Nonetheless, this is precisely the passage in which the 
constitution may become the anchor of subsequent political life, even 
when the unfolding of constitutional events takes a path different 
from the path originally traced by the revolutionary leaders. 
It is a huge merit of Ackerman’s book to put at the centre of the 
scene all the unexpected twists and turns that eventually lead to a 
specific constitutional configuration. In what Ackerman labels as time 
three, when politicians and the masses move towards the 
normalisation of revolutionary politics, jurists and judges have a 
window of opportunity. They can then claim that, in the 
interpretation of the constitutional settlement, their doctrines are 
more deeply embedded in the Founding than anything that second 
generation politicians can offer29. If this window of opportunity is 
seized, in time four, constitutional law becomes fully incorporated 
into the legal system by the working of legal scholars and the 
accumulation of decisions rendered on the basis of the constitution. 
This provides: “…the rising generation of lawyers with the cultural 
tools they need to treat constitutional law as fundamentally similar to 
other legal domains that they could discuss with professional self 
confidence.”30. By hinting at this time sequence, the last element of 
the architecture of the book is coming into its place. 
The analysis developed by Ackerman is therefore an analysis 
of constitutions over time. One of the currently much underrated 
functions of a constitution is to secure a legitimate succession to 
government over time, one generation after another. This is an 
achievement that cannot be taken for granted even in the old 
democracies. Side by side with this problem, there is the question of 
how a constitution can legitimately evolve over time, to speak to the 
present generation, rather than to the past ones. 
                                                   
28 C. Geertz, ‘After the Revolution: The Fate of Nationalism in the New States’, in Id., The 
Interpretation of cultures: Selected Essay, at 234, (1973). 
29 Ackerman, Revolutionary Constitutions, cit. at 1, 10. 
30 Ackerman, Revolutionary Constitutions, cit. at 1, 162. 
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On this last point Ackerman’s book is fully in line with the 
vision articulated in the three previous volumes of his masterpiece 
WE The People. In that work, he argued for a less court- centered 
approach to US constitutional law and in favour of a more holistic, 
“regime-centered”, approach to constitutional change. Revolutionary 
constitutions is guided as well by the deep belief that that “We the 
People” are actually responsible for the constitution-making process 
and its successive transformations. Ackerman makes clear that, 
especially in the case of revolutionary constitutions “Popular 
sovereignty isn't a myth” and that politics is responsible for change in 
constitutional doctrine. The place assigned in this book to charismatic 
figures like De Gaulle, Nehru, De Gasperi, Ben-Gurion, Mandela etc., 
is huge. Nonetheless, this book is also a vigorous illustration of the 
paradoxical power of formal constitutional constraints. Ackerman 
thus laments that Franklin D. Roosevelt failed to constitutionalise the 
social reforms of the new deal by passing the constitutional 
amendments that would have made those reforms constitutional law 
once and for all. Unfortunately, Roosevelt preferred instead to have 
them sanctioned by Supreme Court precedents. For Ackerman, this 
failure ultimately left open to the originalists the possibility of 
arguing that the original founding has pre-eminent importance in the 
reading of the constitution. This line of argument is perhaps 
surprising, in a book that is so vigorously animated by realism. To me 
the originalists’ take on the constitution owes very little to the 
proclaimed fidelity to the historical foundations of the constitutional 
text, and owes much more to the current distribution of economic 
and political power in the US. This hugely asymmetric distribution 
has become a serious hindrance to democratic government, despite 
the constitutional safeguards that are still in place, and the vigorous 
political and civic life of the country. The history of the 
Reconstruction following the Civil War shows how written 
constitutional amendments can still be warped and virtually nullified 
by conservative Courts31. But I am ready to share Ackerman’s point 
that with the new deal amendments incorporating certain social 
                                                   
31 E. Foner, The Second Founding: How the Civil War and Reconstruction Remade the 
Constitution (2019). 
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rights the US constitution would have entered the twentieth century 




Ackerman’s book will not shake the faith of those comparative 
constitutional lawyers that trade in the tools provided by quantitative 
social sciences and digital technologies to assess constitutions and 
map the growth of constitutionalism at the world level. Nor will the 
lessons contained in the book prevent some ongoing constitutional 
bric-a-brac. But this book is a firm and sober denunciation of an 
ideology, namely that there can be a ‘one size fits all’ variety of 
constitutionalism. The search for a ready made recipe that by itself 
will guarantee the unmitigated good of a democratic constitution is a 
dangerous illusion. 
The fact that this denunciation comes from a leading liberal 
light makes it even more important, bringing to the table as it does 
weighty arguments against isolationism and unbridled optimism 
about the fate of world constitutionalism. The great lesson of this 
book is the invitation to take the blinkers off, and to come to the 
ground where the fight for shaping the constitution goes on. On this 
ground the fight is eventually gained or lost by the political forces, 
with the contribution of jurists and judges. On the basis of this 
incandescent material, a comparative constitutional theory can be 
built – we are not simply left with the chronicle of the events – and 
this will cast light on the effective value of the constitutional 
settlement that is established for a time.  
 
 
